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1. INTRODUCTION 
A game v is a bounded, real nonnegative valued function, defined on a 
field .Z of subsets of a set P, which maps the empty set to zero (i.e., v(+) = 0). 
The purpose of this paper is to characterize those games for which any solu- 
tion to the following problem is countably additive: minimize A(P) where X 
is an additive real valued function on Z such that X(S) > w(S) for all S in 2’. 
The conditions for the existence of minimum in this problem and its 
value are well known. (References are discussed in Section 5.) To every game 
v we associate an extended real number 1 a 1, called the norm of v: 
j 21 / = sup{Ziaiv(Si) j (ai , St) is a finite sequence in R x Z, 
ai 3 0 and &aJ&) < 1 for all p in P>, (1) 
where R is the set of real numbers and Is is the indicator function of S in 2, 
i.e., 1&) = 1 for p in S and Is(p) = 0 for p in the complement of S. Then 
the minimum exists and is equal to ) v 1 iff 1 v ) is finite. 
This problem arose in the theory of cooperative games, where it was 
stated somewhat differently. An outcome of a game v is an additive real valued 
function, say h, on Z such that h(P) = v(P). If an outcome h fulfills also 
h(S) > o(S) for all S in 2 it belongs, by definition, to the core of the game. 
Our main result (Theorem 3.2) states the condition on v which is equivalent 
to the property that every element in the core of v is countably additive. This 
condition is sequential continuity of v at P where a sequence (S,) in Z 
convergent to P if (S,) is monotone increasing and P = u S, . (S, r P). 
If Z is a u-field, this condition implies also (Theorem 3.10) the existence of a 
measure on 2 such that every element in the core is obsolutely continuous 
with respect to it. We can, then, and via the Radon-Nikodym theorem, 
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represent every element in the core by a real-valued function on P, i.e., to 
indicate the personal outcome or payoff to every player, as is called an element 
of P. (Whereas set functions indicate the payoffs of coalitions, i.e., elements 
of 2, only.) 
However, Theorems 3.2 and 3.10 are stated only for the class of exact 
games. This class is introduced in Section 2. Theorem 2.2 describes the 
mapping that associates with every game v of finite norm an exact game v’ so 
that if v has nonempty core then v” has the same core. Hence the results of 
Section 3 can be and are restated for any game of finite norm (Corollaries 3.3 
and 3.12). (The corollaries in this paper are not followed by proofs because 
of their simplicity.) Two additional results, 4.2 and 4.4, are proved in Sec- 
tion 4. Theorem 4.4 connects our work with that of Kannai [4, Theorem 11. 
This connection is discussed in Section 5. It should be remarked that the 
main results of Kannai [4] are for games defined on a topological space, which 
is outside the scope of this paper. 
2. EXACT ENVELOPE OF A GAME 
2.1. Notations and conventions. 
For S in Z we denote by S the element P\S in L!Y and by S* the indicator 
function of S. Similarly .Z* denotes the set {S* / S E Z) and B is the Banach 
space spanned by Zc* with the sup norm. The space of bounded additive set 
functions on .E, ba is isometrically isomorphic to the norm-dual of B; for h 
in ba we denote by h* the corresponding continuous linear functional on B. 
Inequalities between functions are assumed to hold pointwise. The number 0 
denotes the origin of any linear space mentioned in the paper. IfL is a space of 
functions L, = (X EL / x 3 0}, in particular R, is the set of nonnegative real 
numbers. A functional f on a linear space is superlinear if it is superadditive 
(i.e., f (x + Y) 3 f(x) + f (y)) and p osi ive homogenous (i.e., f (Xx) = Af (x) ‘t’ 
for h E R, . It is sublinear if -f is superlinear. To avoid uninteresting com- 
plications it is assumed throughout this paper that the sets P and C are 
nonempty and v is not identically zero. 
THEOREM 2.2. Let v be a game with $nite norm on 2 and consider the 
following three real valued functions on .Z: 
6(S) = inf{A(S) / h E ba, h > v and h(P) = j v I} SE.z (2) 
V(S) = sup(Zaiv(S,) / (ai , &) is a$nite sequence in
R, x .Z and Z’aiSi* 6 S*} SE 2 t3) 
V=(S) = sup(Zaiv(SJ - a 1 v j 1 (ai , Si) is a jnite sequence 
in R, x Z, a E R, and ZaiSi* - aP* < S*> SE2 (4) 
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Tken 
G(P) = E(P) = v(P) and 6=v’>v. 
Proof. The functions B and v are well defined because 1 v j is finite and 
G(P) = 1 v 1 = u(P) < E(P). We will show that V=(P) < j v / . Otherwise there 
are a finite sequence (ai , SJ and a 3 0 so that ,Zaiv(Si) - a / ZJ 1 > 1 v / and 
Za,S,* - aP* < P*. Then 
2 -s.- v(SJ > I v 1 
a+1 
and Z -f3- si* < p*, 
a+1 
a contradiction to the definition of ) v j in (1) and the proof of the first part 
of the theorem is completed. 
The inequality E > v is obvious. Also the proof of 6 > V= is simple. Given A 
in ba so that h 3 v and A(P) = / v /, we get S* >, ZuiSi* - aP* implies 
h(S) = h*(S*) 3 h*(ZaiSi* - aP*) 
= ZaiX(Si) - ah(P) 3 Zuiv(Si) - a 1 v (. 
Hence, h(S) 3 Z(S) an d as h was arbitrary 6(S) 3 E(S). The passage to the 
limit is unnecessary because of the following remark. 
Remark 2.3. The infimum in the definition of d in (2) can be changed to 
minimum because the set {h E ba / h 3 v and X(P) = 1 v I} is compact in the 
B topology of ba. 
To complete the proof of 2.2 the inequality V= 3 8 is proved via the separat- 
ing theorem. To this end we define a function f on B: 
f(x) = sup(zhiv(Si) - a j v I J (ai , SJ is a finite sequence in 
R, x Z, a E R, and .ZaiSi* - aP* < x} x E B. (5) 
The functional f is the extension of B from Z* to B (where we identify Z 
with ,Z*). f is superlinear on B. Homogenity of f is obvious. To prove 
superlinearity of f let X, y E B and E > 0 be given. Then there are finite 
sequences (ai , Si) and (bj , Tj) in R, x 2 and a, b in R, so that 
zh,S,* - aP* < x, ZbjTj* - bP* < y, 
ZU,V(Si) - a / v I > f (x) - $ 
and 
Zb,v(T,) - b 1 v j 3 f(y) - +. 
The two inequalities in B imply Za,S,* + Zb3Tj* - (a + b) P* < x + y 
and this together with the other two inequalities imply 
f(x +Y) >f(x) +f(Y) - 6. 
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Given S in Z let 
A = {x E B I f(x) 2 I v I>, B={xEB~x<P*) 
and 
C= stB~x+S* 
1 
if f(S*) # 0. 
Let D be the convex hull of B union C. The set A is convex because of the 
superlinearity of f. We will show later that int A n D = $3. Then by the 
separation theorem (See Dunford and Schwartz [2, V. 2.81) there is a nonzero 
linear functional F on B such that 
F(x) < F(P*) = F (& S*) <F(Y) 
for all x in D and y in A. The equality is implied by the fact that both P* and 
I VJ I/f(S*) S* b e ong to A and D. Because 2P* is an interior point of A we 1 
get that F(P*) > 0, hence we assume that F(P*) = 1 v j. For every T in Z, 
nT*+P*eA hence F(T*) 30. If f(T*)=O then F(T*)>f(T*). If 
f(T*) > 0 let r > 0 be such that f (rT*) = 1 v 1. Then F(rT*) 3 I v 1 or 
F(T*) >f(T*). W e h ave, of course, that F(S*) = f (S*). So the set function 
induced by F is in the core of v’ and obtains v’(S) = f (S*) in S. 
We have to prove that f (x) ,< / v I f or x in D. Because of the monotonicity 
off it is sufficient to show that 
f(rP*+sf#S*)$Iuj forO<r=l--<I. 
We will prove that f (P* + tS*) = / ZJ I + tf (S*) for t > 0. This implies, by 
homogeneity off, that 
fi yp* + s f;;") -s* > =rlwI +slal=l211. 
The inequality f (P* + tS*) > I v 1 + tf(S*) is implied by the super- 
linearity off. To prove the other inequality let ZaiSi* - aP* < P* + ~9”. 
Then .ZaiSi* - (a + 1) P* < tS* which implies, by definition off, that 
J&J(&) - (a + 1) I 21 I ,< tf(S*> or ZUiW(Si) - a / V I < 1 v 1 + tf (S*). 
In order to complete the proof we have to deal with the case that f (S*) = 0. 
In this case we define C = uf, {X E B I x < nS*}. We have 
f (YP* + snS*) = Y I v 1 + sfzf (S*) = Y j v I < 1 v I forO<r<l. 
So the previous part of the proof works. The only point to check is that 
F(S*) = 0. Otherwise, if F(S*) > 0, we have for some A, F(nS*) > 1 w I, a 
contradiction to the separation property of F. Q.E.D. 
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COROLLARY 2.4. .-I game z has nonempty core i f f  v(P) = / v  /. 
DEFINITION 2.5. A game v is exact iff o = 5. A game 2: has an exact core 
if for every S in E there is h in the core of v with X(S) = v(S). Using these 
two definitions we can rephrase the equality 6 = 5 in the following way: 
COROLLARY 2.6. A game has an exact core i f f  it is exact. 
DEFINITION 2.7. A game v is called totally balanced if v = 6 It is called 
convex if v(S) + v(T) < v(S u T) + v(S n T) for S, T in ,Z. It is balanced 
if v(P) = / v  [. 
In order to justify the name of this section we will call 5, for a given game v, 
the exact envelope of v. In the following paragraphs we will show, by examples, 
that the class of exact games is different from the class of totally balanced 
games or convex games. However, every convex game is exact (Shapley [7] 
and Theorem 2.2) and every exact game is totally balanced (Theorem 2.2). 
The exact games seem to be the appropriate tool for inquiry of cores of games 
because games with nonempty cores and identical exact envelopes have 
identical cores. 
EXAMPLE 2.8 (Kannai [4]). Let P = (1, 2, 3,...} and for S a subset of P; 
v(S) = 
i 
1 E S and S is infinite 
otherwise. 
The game v is balanced because the core is nonempty. Indeed the simple set 
function X(S) = 1 iff 1 E S is in the core. It is easy to check that X is the 
unique element in the core of v. Hence, v is not exact because 
h((l,2}) = 1 > v({l, 2)) = 0. 
The game is totally balanced because if v(S) = 0 then v(T) = 0 for T C S 
and then V(S) = 0 because the Sa in the definition of v (see (3)) are included 
in S. 
EXAMPLE 2.9. This is a small variation of the previous example that shall 
show again a totally balanced game which is not exact. This time the set of 
players is finite. P = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) and v is defined 
v(S) = 1; lESand(S134 otherwise. (7) 
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EXAMPLE 2.10. An exact game which is not convex. P = (1,2, 3,4}, CL, v 
two additive set functions of P defined: 
P({2)) = P(I4)) = 2, CL(U)) = P((3)) = v({2)) = v({4)) = 4, 
v(U)) = 3, and v((3)) = 1. 
Then p(P) = v(P) = 12 and we define the game, for SC P: 
v(S) = min{p(S), v(S)}. (8) 
The game a is exact because its core is exact, however: 
~({2,3}) + 7X(3,41) = 5 + 5 > ~((2, 334)) + ~((3)) = 8 + 1. 
This example also shows that “the convex envelope” of a game may not exist. 
3. MAIN RESULTS 
DEFINITION 3.1. A game v is continuous at P if er(S,J -+ v(P) for any 
monotone sequence (S,) in Z with S, t P. It is continuous at 4 if v(S,) ---f 0 
for any monotone sequence (S,) with S, 4 4. (S, t S means U,, S, = S and 
S, 4 S means fin S, = S). 
THEOREM 3.2. Let v be an exact game. Every element in the core of v  is 
countably additive zjf v is continuous at P. 
Proof. By definition, /\ in ba is countably additive iff it is continuous at P. 
Let h be in the core of v and assume that v is continuous at P. Then, the 
inequality X >, v together with the equality h(P) = v(P) complete the proof 
in one direction. 
In order to prove the nontrivial implication assume that every element in 
the core is countably additive. Let S, t P and v(S,J t a. The exactness of v 
implies that for every n there is X, in the core of v so that /\n(S,J = v(S,). 
As the core is compact in the B topology, the sequence (JI,J has a cluster 
point, say A, in the core of v. By the assumption A is countably additive. 
Hence, given E > 0 there is k so that h(S,) > h(P) - E for every n > k. 
Choose m > K. There are infinitely many integers n for which 
I USm) - wm>l -=c 6. 
Let I> m be such an integer. Then: 
v(P) = v> < wn) + E < 4(&n) + 2E < h(K) + 26 
= a(&) + 2~ < a + 2~. 
So v(P) = a and the proof is completed. Q.E.D. 
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COROLLARY 3.3. Every element in the core of the balanced game v  is 
countably additive i f f  5 is continuous at P. 
DEFINITION 3.4. Let v be a game with / v 1 < co, then the normal core 
of v is defined: 
&={A~baIA>vandA(P)=(v/). (9) 
Notation 3.5. We denote by ca the set of countably additive set functions 
in ba and pa denotes the set of purely finitely additive set functions in ba. 
By the theorem of Hewitt and Yosida [2,111.7.8], ba = ca + pa, i.e., every X 
in ba can be uniquely represented; h = h, + A, , h, in ca and X, in pa. 
COROLLARY 3.6. Let v  be a game with finite norm. Then N;, C ac ifl V= is 
continuous at P. 
DEFINITION 3.7. An element S of 2 is v-null if v(S u Ii) = v(R) for 
every R is 2:. Because v(d) = 0 we have that v(S) = 0 and v(S) = v(P) for 
every v-null set S. If the game v  is monotone (i.e. S C R implies v(S) < v(R)), 
then any subset of a v-null set is v-null (if it belongs to 2). 
EXAMPLE 3.8. We give an example of a game v that only 4 is its null set, 
v will be the unanimity game with P = [0, l] and Z = 2p. For S in 2 we 
define 
VW = f 
1 S=P 
() otherwise. (10) 
The empty set @ is the only v-null set even when Z is restricted to the 
Lebesque (or Borel) subsets of P. 
DEFINITION 3.9. Let v  and u be two games. We say the v  is u-continuous 
if every u-null set is v-null. 
THEOREM 3.10. Let v  be an exact game and continuous at P. Assume also 
that .Z is a a-jield. Then there is a positive X in ca so that (i) v  is X-continuous 
(ii) A is v-continuous and (iii) every element in the core of v  is h-continuous. 
Proof, First we remark that (i) implies (iii) for balanced games. Let S be 
X-null. Then S is v-null. So v(S) = v(P) which implies that a(S) = a(P) 
for every 01 in the core of v. However, in our proof we will construct h in ca 
that fulfills (iii) and this will lead to (i) and (ii). 
By Theorem 3.2 the core of v is contained in ca. It is bounded and the 
countable additivity of TV on Z is uniform with respect to TV in the core. The 
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last statement is implied by the continuity of v at P. Indeed let S, J $ and p 
be in the core. Then $, r P and ~(3%) 3 ~(3%). Hence, 
So the core of u is weakly sequentially compact (see Dunford-Schwartz 
[2, IV.9.1]). By the next theorem in Dunford-Schwartz [2, IV.9.21 there is a 
positive /\ in ca so that every TV in the core is h-continuous and the continuity 
is uniform with respect to y in the core. In addition, the construction of /\ in 
the proof in [2] asserts that a h can be chosen with the property: p(S) = 0 
for every p in the core implies h(S) = 0. This property, together with the 
remark in the beginning of the proof, implies that /\ is w-continuous. 
To complete the proof we show that if S is h-null it also is v-null. Otherwise 
there is R so that v(S u R) > v(R). (A n exact game is monotone.) As w is 
exact there is p in the core with p(R) = v(R) which implies that p(S) > 0. 
But p is h-continuous, a contradiction. Q.E.D. 
Remark 3.11. Let u and v be two games, then; “6 is u-continuous” does 
not imply “v is u-continuous.” For example, consider the Lebesque measure 
h on [0, 11. Let 6 = u = h and v = 8 with the exception v([O, l/2]) = 0. If S 
is X-null and S\[O, l/2] # 4 then S is not v-null. 
COROLLARY 3.12. Let v  be a balanced game defined on a o-field Z. If the 
exact envelope of v  is continuous at P then there is A in ca so that every element 
in the core of v  is &continuous (and countably additive). This result holds, in 
particular, when v  itself is continuous at P. 
COROLLARY 3.13. Let v  be a game of jinite norm de$ned on a u-field Z: If 5 
is continuous at P then there is h in ca so that every element in the normal core of v  
is h-continuous (and countably additive). 
DEFINITION 3.14. A game v is inner continuous at S in .Z if for every 
increasing sequence S, t S we have v(S,) -+ v(S). It is inner continuous if it is 
inner continuous at every S in S. It is outer continuous if we change S,, t S to 
S, J S. Continuity holds, by definition, if inner and outer continuity hold. 
At P, inner continuity is equivalent to continuity. 
PROPOSITION 3.15. An exact game, continuous at P, is continuous. 
Proof. We use and repeat the proof of Theorem 3.2. Let a be an exact 
game and continuous at P. By Theorem 3.2 the core of v is contained in ca. 
Let S, J S. The monotonicity of w implies that v(S) ,< lim v(S,). The 
exactness of v and Theorem 3.2 imply that for some h in the core of v we 
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have v(S) = A(S) = lim h(S,) 3 lim v(S,). (The second equality is because 
of the countable additivity of A.) Finally let T, t T and v(T,) T a. The proof 
that a 3: v(T) is exactly the same as in Theorem 3.2, hence it is omitted. 
Q.E.D. 
4. ADDITIONAL RESULTS 
THEOREM 4.1. Let v be a game and let A be in ca [respectively, pa] so that 
v < X. Then there is p in ca [respectively, pa] so that TV >, v and p(P) = / v I. 
In addition p is X-continuous. 
Proof. The inequality v < h implies that v < X and in particular / v 1 
is finite and h 3 0. We write LI for L1(P, 2, h) and S denotes the element of 
L1 which corresponds to S in .Z. We define a functional h on L+l: 
h(x) = sup(Za&S,) 1 (ai , SJ is a finite sequence in 
R, x Z such that .Za,S,l < x}. (11) 
It is obvious that h is superlinear on L+l and h(g) = B(S) for S in Z. In 
particular, h(Pl) = 1 v /. 
We define the following two subsets of L1: A = (X E L+l / h(x) > 1 v I> and 
B = {x eL1 ) ) x IL1 < h(P)}. We h ave A n B = #. Otherwise, there is y 
with h(y) > / v 1 and / y IL1 < h(P) - E for some c > 0. Hence, there is a 
finite sequence (ai , &) in R, x .Z such that 
so 
0 < .?ZaJ> <y and &z&sJ > 1 v 1 - 5 . 
and 
But 
a contradiction. So A and B are two convex disjoint sets in L1 and B has an 
interior point. By a separation theorem (see Dunford and Schwartz [2, 
V.2.81) there is a continuous linear functional, say F, on Ll and a number c 
so that F(x) < c < F(y) for every x in B and every y in A, and F # 0. As 0 
is an interior point of B and F is nontrivial we have c > 0, so we can assume 
that c = ( v / . As P is in the closure of B and in A we have F(P1) = 1 v /. 
For S in z‘ we have F(B) > 0. Otherwise, if F(9) < 0 then, 
F(S) = F(P1 - 9)=IwI-F(Sl)>)v), 
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a contradiction to S1 E B. Now we show that F(SI) 3 h(9) for S in Z. If 
h(9) = 0 then the inequality holds because F(9) > 0. If h(9) > 0 then 
there is d > 1 such that dh(9) = ) v /. So 
d&S) = F(dS1) 3 ) 71 1 = dh(9). 
To complete the proof notice that if A E ca then L” is the norm dual of L1, 
hence F induces a countably additive measure p on .Z which is h-continuous 
and we proved that p(P) = 1 v 1 and p(S) = F(S1) 3 h(S1) = a(S) > o(S) 
for every S in 2. If A E pa then there is a sequence S, t P such that A(&,) = 0 
for 71 = 1, 2,... . So 1 S,,l IL1 = 0 for all n and the continuity of F implies that 
the induced additive set function p fulfills p(Sn) = 0 for all n. Hence TV E pa. 
Q.E.D. 
DEFINITION 4.2. Let u be a game of finite norm, then the dual of v is the 
game d defined by v”(S) = ) v / - v(S), S E .Z and S # 4. 
THEOREM 4.3. Let v be a game of finite norm, then for all S in .Z: 
V=(S) = sup{Zap(S,) - A’b$(Tj) 1 (ai , &) and (bj , Tj) are$nite 
sequences in R, x Z and Za$‘i* - ZbjT,” < S*>. (12) 
By the definition of B (2.2 (4)) and 77(P) the right side of (12) is greater or 
equal than u”(S), for all S in Z. 
Remark 4.4. Let A be in Jlr, then A(S) < v”(S) for all S in .Z Indeed, 
A(S) = h(P) - A(S) = j ZI / - A(S) < 1 a 1 - v(S) = v”(S). 
Specifically, if v is exact then for every S in Z there is h in the core with 
h(S) = v”(S). 
By Corollary 2.6 for a given S in .Z’ there is h in A$ so that B(S) = h(S). 
Let (ai , Si) and (bj , Tj) be as in (12). Then h(Si) > v(S) and h(Tj) < G(T,). 
Hence, 
Zap(&) - Zb$(Ti) < Za$(&) - ZbjA(Tj) ,< A(S) = v’(S). 
Q.E.D. 
5. REMARKS 
The proposition that the core is nonempty iff v(P) = ( w 1 was proved by 
Bondareva [l] and Shapley [6] for finite games. It was shown in [5] that the 
same result holds for arbitrary games. Kannai [4] showed that this result can 
be derived from general duality theorems of Ky Fan [3, Theorem 12, 131. 
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Using these results of Fan Kannai proved also the following theorem. There 
is a countably additive set-function in the core of z, iff there is a game w 
continuous at $ so that 
V(P) = sup(Zui~(Si) - Bjw(Tj) 1 (ui , SJ and (b, , T,) are finite sequences 
in R, x Z and ZaiSi* - ZbjTj* < P*}. (Theorem 1 in [4]). 
Kannai remarked that the usefulness of this theorem is limited because of the 
quantifier “there is”. Nevertheless, this result can be regarded as a departure 
point of our research when the unknown game w is replaced by B and the sup 
is computed for every coalition S in 2’. Theorem 4.2 states that we shall 
obtain in this way the exact envelope of V. Continuity of 5 at (b is equivalent 
to that of z, at P. 
The notion of exact core is not new. It was introduced by Shapley [7] 
for finite games. (He called it a complete core but we feel that this adjective 
had already been used enough in mathematics.) However, Shapley was 
concerned mainly with the characterization of the core of convex game. He 
observed that the class of games with complete cores is included in the class 
of balanced games (nonempty cores) and contains the class of convex games. 
We complete this section with two open problems. Theorem 3.10 differs 
from others because of the additional restriction that Z is a u-field. This 
restriction can be omitted if the following conjecture is proved: An exact 
game continuous at P can be (uniquely) extended to an exact game, on the 
u-field generated by .Z, and continuous at P. 
The second conjecture is: An exact game continuous at $ has a countably 
additive set function in its core. It is easy to see that the condition is necessary. 
Kannai [4, Section 31 gave an example showing that this condition is not 
sufficient when the game is totally balanced (but not exact). 
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